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Preliminary Comments

on the Draft Laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan
“On Activity of Branches and Representations of International or Foreign Non-Profit Organizations in the Territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan” and “On Amendments to Several Legislative Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning Non-Profit Organizations”

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1. INTRODUCTION

1. In April 2005, two draft laws, namely, the Draft Law on Activity of Branches and Representations of International or Foreign Non-Profit Organizations in the Territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and the Draft Law on Amendments to Several Legislative Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning Non-Profit Organizations (hereinafter collectively referred to as the Drafts) were presented, along with a “Note of Explanation”, to the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan by a group of deputies.

2. The comments hereafter have been prepared at the request of the OSCE Centre to Almaty on the basis of an English translation of the above mentioned draft laws and “Note of Explanation”.

2. SCOPE OF REVIEW

3. These comments examine the compatibility with international human rights standards, including OSCE human dimension commitments, of two above-mentioned draft laws. They do not purport to provide a comprehensive review.

4. The international standards relevant to this opinion are primarily those concerned with the right to freedom of association, to which the Republic of Kazakhstan has shown its commitment through signing the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, its ratification of both the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention), its commitments as a State belonging to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and its support for the UN Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognised Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Declaration on Human Rights Defenders).

In addition guidance on the scope of the right to freedom of association can be derived from rulings of judicial bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights and, as is recognised in the “Note of Explanations” to the Draft Law on Activity of Branches, to treaties such as the European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of

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4 See Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, Paras. 9.3 and 10.3.

International Non-Governmental Organisations, to “soft-law” instruments such as the Fundamental Principles on the Legal Status of Non-governmental Organisations in Europe (adopted within the framework of the Council of Europe)\(^6\) and to the practices of other OSCE participating States. However, the provisions in the Draft Laws also have potential implications for the exercise of other human rights, notably freedom of expression and rights to education and to privacy, and they are, therefore, also taken into account in the examination of their provisions.

5. The opinion considers the two Draft Laws in tandem as the Draft Law on Amendments enshrines a number of provisions consequential on the adoption of the Draft Law on Activity of Branches – dealing with matters such as the creation of administrative offences, the application of registration requirements, the giving of information about activities and the financing of such activities – and thus clarifies the character of the obligations being imposed by that draft law. However, it also needs to be kept in mind that the provisions in the Draft Laws could also have implications for the conduct of organisations that are not international or foreign. Thus the opinion looks first at the nature of the organisations that would actually be regulated by the Draft Laws. It then considers the prerequisites for the operation of these organisations, their admissible and prohibited objectives, their reporting and other obligations, the process for establishing a branch or representative office and the arrangements for the suspension and liquidation of such a branch or representative office. It concludes by examining the provisions dealing with the property of branches and representative offices, arrangements for accountability and liability and the effect of the concluding and transitory provisions.

6. The OSCE ODIHR would like to mention that the comments provided herein are without prejudice to any further comments or recommendations that the ODIHR may wish to make on the draft legislation under consideration.

3. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

7. The Draft Laws, which seek to regulate the operation in the Republic of Kazakhstan of international and foreign non-profit organizations, approach the task with an inappropriately restrictive philosophy. The effect of their provisions is to impose restrictions that are disproportionate to any legitimate objectives that might be pursued and which will not only impede the legitimate activities of such organizations but also interfere in an unwarranted manner with the rights and freedoms of persons in the Republic of Kazakhstan. Furthermore there are many provisions for which more precise language is needed and a number whose actual object and effect is in need of clarification. There is an urgent need for the latter provisions to be recast in the light of the suggestions made hereafter.

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\(^6\) Full text in English and Russian is available at [http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal_Affairs/Legal_co-operation/Civil_society/](http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal_Affairs/Legal_co-operation/Civil_society/) (last visited on 10 March 2005).
8. It is recommended that the Draft Laws be modified so as:

(a) to restrict their application to organisations established in accordance with the legislation of a foreign State by foreign States or persons within them (para. 13);
(b) to make it clear that it is not necessary to establish a branch or representative office in order to provide a speaker at a meeting organised by some locally-established body, to mail literature to persons who have requested it and to appoint persons to provide an organization with information on matters which might be relevant to its mandate (para. 17);
(c) to require only that an organization obtain approval to initiate activities in the Republic of Kazakhstan and that such an organization remain free to decide whether it considers it necessary to carry out its activities through the formation of a branch or representative office (para. 20);
(d) to provide for the grant of any approval to operate being made subject to receipt of appropriate evidence that the organization concerned is entitled under its charter to operate in the Republic of Kazakhstan, with the evidence for this purpose varying according to the situation in the particular country of establishment (para. 22);
(e) to clarify the scope of the “public benefit” requirement for foreign non-profit organizations to conduct activities in the Republic of Kazakhstan, whether it must be fulfilled by both the organization and its branch or representative office and whether the requirement of purposes of “public benefit” and “benefit for all members” are cumulative or alternative (paras. 24-26);
(f) to provide that the only other basis for refusing approval for an organization (or a branch or representative office) to conduct activities in the Republic of Kazakhstan is a to reasonable ground for concluding that its proposed activities would be unconstitutional or unlawful (para. 32);
(g) to require that any such refusal of approval be reasoned (para. 33);
(h) to clarify and narrow the scope of the term “financing” of the activity of political parties, trade unions and religious associations (para. 34);
(i) to restrict the notice requirement to events for which a foreign non-profit corporation (or its branch or representative office) is solely responsible and to limit the details of the information about participants that must be provided (paras. 37 and 38);
(j) to clarify what additional information about an event might be required, when this might be required and, insofar as this is before the event, to delete such a requirement (para. 39);
(k) to clarify the right of access of local executive bodies and to restrict it generally to ones that are open to the public (para. 41);
(l) to delete the citizenship requirement for the head of branches and representative bodies and for members of executive boards of foundations (para 43);
(m) to require the Ministry of Justice to specify its concerns about an application for accreditation of a branch or representative office rather than simply require further information; as well as to provide that the deadline for the application consideration run from the time of submission of documents listed as necessary and not from the “the submission of the complete set of documents.” (para 45);
(n) to restrict the grounds for refusal of accreditation to unreliable information and reasonable grounds to conclude that unconstitutional or unlawful activities are being proposed, with all refusals being reasoned (para. 52);
(o) to specify that suspension of the activity of a foreign non-profit corporation or its branch or representative office, the prohibition on the organization operating in the country or the liquidation of its branch or representative office must always be exceptional, be based on relevant and sufficient evidence and proportionate (para. 53);
(p) to limit the duration of suspension imposed by a prosecutor and remove the three-month minimum period of suspension imposed by a court (paras. 54 and 55);
(q) to delete suspension or liquidation for violation of a branch or representative office’s statute and to delete the unspecified grounds for liquidation in the absence of a compelling justification for them (paras 57 and 59);
(r) to reconsider the scope of the prohibition on anonymous donations (para. 60);
(s) to delete the requirement for prior approval of financing, donations and other kinds of material assistance for specific activities (para. 66);
(t) to provide a more precise indication as to scope of the obligation to report on activities and as to the means for verifying the authenticity of information so published (paras. 68 and 69);
(u) to clarify the effect of the amendments being made to the banking and tax legislation (para. 70);
(v) to ensure that proportionality governs the imposition of any fines (para. 71);
(w) to remove liability for foreign non-profit organizations insofar as they are required to establish a branch or representative office (para. 72); and
(x) to allow an existing branch or representative office that has applied for accreditation under the new legislation to continue to operate until the accreditation process has been completed (para 73).
4. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

9. As the “Note of Explanation” indicates, the provisions in the Draft Laws are shaped by an analysis of international experience which is said to show “that legislation sets up a strict control over all directions of operations of NGOs”. However, such an analysis is actually at odds with both the approach of international instruments such as the Fundamental Principles on the Legal Status of Non-governmental Organisations in Europe\(^7\) and the general practice of States in regulating the activities of non-profit organizations\(^8\).

4.1 Organizations being regulated

10. Article 1 of the Draft Law on Activity of Branches indicates that it is directed at the branches and representative offices of “international or foreign non-profit organisations” and the latter are defined as ones “established in accordance with the legislation of a foreign state or the provisions of international treaties, and the founders of which are international organizations, foreign states immediately (themselves) or in the person of their representative bodies, foreigners, stateless persons, foreign legal entities”.

11. This definition would seem to be potentially problematic in that it would cover the United Nations, its Specialised Agencies and bodies established by these. The problem arising from such coverage stems not from the impact on the right to freedom of association – which has no application to bodies of this kind – but from the likelihood of the application of the provisions in the Draft Laws to the first body and any established by it running counter to the obligations undertaken by the Republic of Kazakhstan as a party to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations\(^9\).

12. Although the conduct of United Nations activities within a member State is not entirely free from regulation, the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and bilateral arrangements are the more appropriate legal basis for effecting this and it seems surprising that the Draft Law on the Activity of Branches is endeavouring to change that approach – entailing a possible breach of treaty commitments – in this indirect manner. Similar difficulties might arise in respect of other international organizations established pursuant either to treaties to which the Republic of Kazakhstan is a party (such as the Commonwealth of Independent States) or other acts of States in which it has participated such as the Organization for Co-operation and Security in Europe. These difficulties might be avoided for organizations created by treaty as a result of the priority given by Article 3 to any treaty establishing different regulations than those stipulated in the Draft Law. However, while this underlines both the lack of any real need to cover such international organizations - treaties will govern their position - and the risk of confusion for officials whose lack of familiarity with treaty requirements

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\(^7\) Notably in Principles 45, 66, 70 and 77.  
\(^9\) It acceded to it on 26 August 1998. Kazakhstan has not yet acceded to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies.
could lead them to impede the legitimate activities of such organizations, there is not even an attempt to prevent problems from being encountered in fulfilling commitments with regard to international organizations established in other ways.

13. Insofar as the Draft Laws are needed, it might thus be considered more appropriate for its application to be restricted to organisations established in accordance with the legislation of a foreign State by foreign States or persons within them. Thus the rest of this opinion only refers hereafter to foreign non-profit organizations.

4.2 Prerequisites for operation in the Republic of Kazakhstan

14. Article 2 of the Draft Law on the Activity of Branches imposes a requirement that foreign non-profit organizations seeking to operate in the Republic of Kazakhstan do so exclusively through their branches and representative offices there and then only in circumstances where their charters provide for the possibility of them extending their activities to the territory of two or more States.

15. The first aspect of this requirement is problematic in that there is a lack of clarity regarding the term “carry out activity in the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan”. Certainly this is a term that could cover a wide range of possibilities from providing a speaker at a meeting organised by some locally-established body in Kazakhstan, the mailing of literature to persons living there and who have requested it and the appointment of persons there to provide the organization concerned with information on matters which might be relevant to its mandate through to the holding on its own behalf of meetings and similar activities in the Republic of Kazakhstan.

16. The lack of clarity as to what is covered is inconsistent with the requirement that rights such as freedom of association and freedom of expression be subject only to restrictions that are sufficiently precise so that it is possible to foresee whether or not particular conduct is caught by them. Furthermore, insofar as it extends to conduct of the type given in the first three examples, there is also a grave risk that it will be a disproportionate restriction on the freedom of assembly, association and expression of persons in the Republic of Kazakhstan as the requirement to have a branch or representative office would in many instances make it impossible for persons to hear speakers, receive literature and associate with organizations outside the country when there is no clear pressing need for such a formality to be observed.

17. It would be appropriate, therefore, for the Draft Law on the Activity of Branches to be modified so as to make it clear that activities of this kind are not being subjected to the prerequisite of having a branch or representative office.

18. However, the prerequisite would not cease to be problematic if its scope was expressly limited to a more substantial form of operation within the country – such as the holding of meetings and the provision of education and training – since the need to establish a distinct entity for this purpose could still impose a disproportionate burden on
the organization concerned, particularly if the operation is one intended to be of a relatively short duration.

19. Although normative instruments such as the Fundamental Principles on the Status of NGOs in Europe have recognised that some form of approval might be required in order for a foreign NGO to operate within a country, there has also been recognition that the formalities should not be excessive since that instrument has specifically provided that there should not be any need for “a new and separate entity” to be established for this purpose. Moreover the existence of a separate entity is not an essential requirement for the regulation of a particular activity – it is significant that the “Note of Explanation” does not advance any basis for considering such a requirement to be necessary and appears to have overlooked the specific provision just cited from the Fundamental Principles when referring to the latter instrument in the context of the Draft Law’s accreditation provisions - and the interests of the Republic of Kazakhstan would be sufficiently served by a requirement that a foreign non-profit organization not commence activities of this kind before it has first obtained approval for it do so, with the activities themselves being subject to any regulatory requirements applicable to them. Indeed this is the basis on which the only international instrument dealing specifically with this issue – the European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of International Non-Governmental Organisations – proceeds, appreciating that in the case of a body which already has legal personality the more appropriate concerns lie first in confirming that this is in fact the case and then in judging whether there are still reasons not to allow such an entity to operate in a given country. There could also be no objection to such approval being conditional on notification being given to the relevant authorities as to who is acting as the representative of the organization (or as to any change in this regard).

20. The Draft Law should thus be amended to require only that an organization obtain approval to initiate activities in the Republic of Kazakhstan and that such an organization be free to decide whether it considers it necessary to carry out its activities through the formation of a branch or representative office.

21. The second aspect of the requirement – entailing the existence of express authorisation in the charter of the organization concerned for the extension of its activity to two or more States – is also inappropriate as it fails to respect the different ways in which organizations may derive their authority to act. Although there may be some traditions which require such authorisation in very detailed terms, there are others where this is not needed as it is well-established that the general authority to do something may carry with it a number of implied powers and these might well include the possibility of carrying out operations outside of the territory in which it is established.

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10 Principle 37.
11 Article 3.
12 Article 4.
22. There may be a legitimate concern on the part of the Republic of Kazakhstan to be satisfied that an organization proposing to operate within its territory has a lawful basis for so doing – not least if it wishes to ensure that recovery of liabilities incurred is not impeded by reliance on some form of *ultra vires* doctrine - but it would be sufficient for the grant of any approval to operate being made subject to receipt of appropriate evidence that the organization concerned is entitled under its charter to operate in the Republic of Kazakhstan, with the evidence for this purpose varying according to the situation in the particular country of establishment. The Draft Law should, therefore, be amended accordingly.

4.3 Admissible and prohibited objectives

23. Article 4(1) of the Draft Law on the Activity of Branches proposes to allow branches and representative offices of foreign non-profit organizations to be established “for the achievement of the purposes aimed at assurance of public benefit and benefit for all members”. This does not seem in itself to be problematic but there are several points where clarification is needed.

24. Firstly there is uncertainty as to the precision of the concept of “public benefit” in the law of the Republic of Kazakhstan; similar terms may be found in the laws of other countries and it is possible that a particular organization may satisfy the test under its own law but not under the law of the Republic of Kazakhstan. It is essential, therefore, that the scope of this restriction be clarified so that organizations can establish whether or not they are capable of meeting this requirement of the Draft Law.

25. Secondly there is a need to clarify whether this requirement must be met by the organization concerned or only by its branches and representative offices (the latter would be the literal reading of the stipulation that “branches and representative offices ... can be established”); it is not unknown for bodies to establish subsidiary entities with a narrower mandate and the possibility of only branches and representative offices having to satisfy the particular requirements of the understanding of “public benefit” in the Republic of Kazakhstan might be advantageous for some organizations wishing to operate there without having to revise their objectives generally but this is still not a sufficient justification for requiring that an organization establish a branch or representative office prior to operating in the country.

26. Thirdly there is a need to clarify whether or not the requirement of purposes of “public benefit” and “benefit for all members” are cumulative or alternative; certainly international organizations and ones established by States will not be ones created to benefit their “membership” insofar as they can be said to have one.

The prohibition in Article 4(2) of branches and representative offices being established “for the expression of the political will of citizens, various social groups, as well as in the purposes to represent their interests in representative and executive governmental bodies, local authorities and to participate in their formation” is in need of further clarification. Although it is not unusual – nor inconsistent with freedom of association or expression - for
non-nationals to be excluded from some aspects of political activity\textsuperscript{13}, such a restriction is generally directed to party politics and governmental and representative activity\textsuperscript{14}.

27. This is in many respects the field covered by the provision under consideration. However, a complete restriction on political activities in a broader, non-party sense, may not be considered justified\textsuperscript{15} and this may be the effect of a term such as “\textit{the expression of the political will of citizens}”, which is certainly capable of covering other activities, notably the promotion of environmental protection and of human rights, in which citizens might wish either to engage the assistance of an international or foreign non-profit organisation (where a matter concerning the Republic of Kazakhstan was involved) or to work with such an organization (where a matter concerning some other country was involved). Insofar as such activity is caught by this prohibition, there would be an excessive interference with the right to freedom of association and expression of persons both in the Republic of Kazakhstan and beyond it.

28. Furthermore it is important to note that this restriction would not only breach more general commitments to secure these rights but could also have an adverse impact on both performance of the commitments regarding public participation under the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention) and the role of non-profit organizations (including foreign ones) under the UN Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognised Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Declaration on Human Rights Defenders)\textsuperscript{16}. A more narrowly drawn definition of the prohibition in Article 4(2) would thus be appropriate. The U.N. Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation of Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights\textsuperscript{17} should also be given close consideration in light of the fact that the Covenant is soon to be ratified by the Republic of Kazakhstan.

29. The further prohibition of purposes or actions by foreign non-profit organisations in Article 4(3) is also problematic in that the language used is insufficiently precise in a number of respects, notwithstanding that there is legitimacy in seeking to bar many of the objectives enumerated. The imprecision – which is not clarified by the “Note of Explanation” and which thus leads to the conclusion that the restriction being imposed on various rights does not satisfy the requirement of being prescribed by law – stems from the

\textsuperscript{13} See Article 16 of the European Convention on Human Rights and specific provision to the contrary in the Council of Europe’s Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at Local Level.

\textsuperscript{14} There can, therefore, be no basis for objecting to the prohibition introduced by Article 5 of the Draft Law on Amendments on foundations whose funds come from foreign States and international and foreign organizations financing the activity of political parties.

\textsuperscript{15} See \textit{Piermont v France}, 27 April 1995.


fact that the items listed in the provision are not an exhaustive list of what amounts to “an interference into internal affairs of state” and they employ broad language such as “exacerbation of social and political situation”, “disorganization of the activity of governmental authorities” and “disturbance of their uninterrupted functioning” which could cover both lawful and unlawful activities, as well as the virtually indefinable catch-all phrase “other undesirable consequences for the Republic of Kazakhstan”.

30. In accordance with the above noted Siracusa Principles, a restriction is necessary if, in addition to (a) being based on one or more of the permissible grounds (i.e. national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others), it “(b) responds to a pressing public of social need, (c) pursues a legitimate aim, and (d) is proportionate to that aim.” 18 Although it may be inferred from the Draft that the provisions in question have been primarily designed to protect national security and public order, which are among the grounds justifying restriction, the Draft nevertheless falls short of meeting the international standard, since it employs an overbroad definition of both “national security” and “public order” terms. According to the Siracusa Principles, “[n]ational security may be invoked to justify measures limiting certain rights only when they are taken to protect the existence of the nation or its territorial integrity or political independence against force or threat of force.” 19 Moreover, national security “cannot be invoked as a reason for imposing limitations to prevent merely local or relatively isolated threats to law and order” 20 nor can it “be used as a pretext for imposing vague or arbitrary limitations and may only be invoked when there exist adequate safeguards and effective remedies against abuse.” 21 There is no doubt that foreign non-profit organizations – more than anyone else – should comply with the law of a country but the purposes enumerated in Article 4(3) will be the basis on which decisions affecting the operation of an organization in the Republic of Kazakhstan can be initiated and the present broad language gives no real basis for being sure that a refusal of permission is based on legitimate grounds as opposed to a fanciful conclusion as to the unacceptability of its intended purposes or actions.

31. The need to avoid the latter is especially important given that the organization will not at this point have done anything and case law before the European Court of Human Rights bears testimony to the significant number of instances in which authorities have been too precipitous in reaching the conclusion that what certain organizations were proposing to do posed a serious threat of unconstitutional or unlawful action, notwithstanding that the particular restrictions involved were themselves entirely legitimate22.

19 Id., Principle 29.
20 Id., Principle 30.
21 Id., Principle 31.
32. The risk of such problems could be avoided simply by replacing the present provisions by a power to refuse approval for an organization (or its branches and representative offices insofar as these were to be established) if there were reasonable grounds for concluding that its proposed activities would be unconstitutional or unlawful (which would also cover the prohibition in Article 4(3) of “terrorist and (or) extremist organizations” insofar as these are governed by the existing criminal law). It should be noted in this connection that the formulation “unconstitutional or unlawful” is already being used as the principal basis for suspending or liquidating a branch or representative office under Article 7 of the Draft Law and it would in any event be desirable to achieve consistency in the criteria being used throughout it.

33. It would, however, be essential for a refusal of approval on this ground – as well as for the one discussed in paragraphs 24-27 – to be reasoned so that there would be scope for challenging a decision that actually lacked sufficient justification. Although it may not always be possible to prevent an organization from acting unconstitutionally or illegally, it is preferable for the imposition of restrictions of an organization to be guided by the deeds of the body concerned rather than the terms used in its formal statement of objectives or mere suppositions as to what they might entail.

34. The prohibition in Article 4(4) of the financing by branches and representative offices of foreign non-profit organizations “of the activity of political parties, trade unions and religious associations” is not generally going to be regarded as problematic given the specific types of bodies covered. However, there is a need to clarify what is understood by the term “financing”; does it mean the direct provision of funds or could it also include activity such as the provision of education and training to persons belonging to such bodies? Certainly “financing” is taken to include “material contributions” in the context of Article 8 of the Draft Law of Activity of Branches. It is thus essential that the scope of such a prohibition be more clearly defined but it is also doubtful whether it is appropriate for forms of support to the members of such bodies, as opposed to the bodies themselves, to be precluded in the absence of some compelling justification for thereby restricting the right of those members to seek information and to associate with others.

35. On a final note, it has to be pointed out that the mention of “extremist acts” in the Draft merits special consideration because of a certain level of imprecision inherent in the very notion of “extremism.” “Extremism” is not defined in any international instrument and thus can not meet the requirements of legality, certainty and foreseeability in the application of the law. The definition of “extremism” would gain in precision if it were linked to a means rather than focused on so-called “extremist goals.” It should depart from the emphasis inherent in such a term on the nature of opinions and beliefs. Instead, a clear connection should be made to the threat of, incitement to, or use of violence.

April 2002, Selim Sadak and Others v Turkey, 11 June 2002 and Dicle for the Democratic Party (DEP) of Turkey v Turkey, 10 December 2002.

23 See para. 51. There are, however, grounds for concern about some of the other bases for suspension or termination.

24 See para. 59.
36. In this connection, it is also noteworthy that the draft provisions in question do not include the element of violence as a necessary precondition when making reference to the change of constitutional order in point 3 of para 3 (although it is included in point 4).

4.4 Reporting and other obligations

37. The imposition by Article 5(2) of the Draft Law on Activity of Branches of a requirement that branches and representative offices of foreign non-profit organizations – or presumably the organizations themselves if the proposal in paragraph 10 is accepted – provide advance notice of their events is not necessarily objectionable given the acceptability of prior approval for operation 25 but, insofar as such events are conducted in collaboration with organizations indigenous to the Republic of Kazakhstan, the requirement – which must be linked with the need for approval for the financing of an activity 26 - could amount to an unjustified restriction on the rights and freedoms of those organizations, particularly as it is hard to envisage a pressing need that could justify them being required to provide advance notice of the type of events listed. It would, therefore, be appropriate to restrict this requirement to one of giving notice where the foreign non-profit organization is solely responsible for the event concerned. Such a qualification – which should also govern the consequential provision on penalties and other matters introduced by Articles 1 and 5 of the Draft Law on Amendments - would also make the requirement of a notice period of ten days more manageable.

38. However, it would still be unreasonable to expect the notice required by Article 5(2) of the Draft Law on the Activity of Branches to involve much detail as regards the “number and composition of the participants” as many of the latter will often make their decision with regard to attendance until just before the event commences. Furthermore those intending to attend may be discouraged from doing so if their names must be communicated to the authorities – something specifically referred to in the “Note of Explanation” and possibly what is intended by the word “composition” in the Draft Law – and, in the absence of evidence of a particular public interest being clearly threatened by a specific event such a disclosure requirement would be an unjustified breach of their rights to freedom of association and expression and to privacy. Absent such a situation, the interest of the Republic of Kazakhstan in knowing would undoubtedly be adequately served by simply knowing the numbers invited and the types of persons involved (e.g., judges, lawyers, professors and students) and this provision should be amended to make it clear that only this is what is needed.

39. There is also a need to clarify what is entailed by the requirement in the third sub-clause of Article 5(2) of the Draft Law on Activity of Branches to provide “information about the events to be held”; is this intended to allow notice to be required even longer in advance than ten days or is it connected to “the materials to be used at the event”, something not

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25 Although it does run somewhat counter to the presumption that an organization’s activity is lawful enshrined in Principle 66 of the Fundamental Principles on the Status of Non-Governmental Organizations in Europe.
26 See paras. 58-65.
mentioned in the Draft Law but included in the “Note of Explanation”. Certainly it would be unsatisfactory for the position to be left as it is and it is doubtful whether there is a sufficient justification for either possibility in the absence of clear evidence that illegal activity is expected to occur. It is the general stance of the international law that NGOs should benefit from the presumption of lawfulness (any activity is lawful in the absence of evidence to the contrary).\(^{27}\)

40. Note, however, that the translation of a similar provision in Article 5 of the Draft Law on Amendments refers to the provision of “information on the executed events”\(^{28}\). This would be less problematic but there would still be a need to be more specific as to the nature and extent of the information needed so that there is no difficulty in complying with such an obligation and the Draft Law should be amended accordingly.

41. Furthermore the stipulation in Article 5(2) of the Draft Law on Activity of Branches that local executive bodies should have access to the events to be held would - where these are not generally open to the public and in the absence of evidence of a particular public interest being clearly threatened by a specific event - be an unjustified breach of their rights to freedom of association and expression and to respect for their private lives. Absent such situations, the interest of the Republic of Kazakhstan in knowing that the event is occurring and this provision should be amended to make it clear that only this is what is involved, with the reach of the consequential provision on penalties and other matters introduced by Articles 1 and 5 of the Draft Law on Amendments also being appropriately limited.

4.5 Establishing a branch or representative office

42. Although it is not considered that the establishment of a branch or representative office should become a prerequisite for a foreign non-profit organization to operate in the Republic of Kazakhstan\(^{29}\), there may well be instances where such an organization considers this to be the basis on which to do so and certain aspects of the accreditation provisions in the Draft Law on Activity of Branches would continue to be of concern, although the consequential ones introduced by Article 3 of the Draft Law on Amendments do not.

43. The requirement in Article 6(1) of the Draft Law on Activity of Branches that the head of a branch or representative office be a citizen of the Republic of Kazakhstan is justified in the “Note of Explanation” by reference to Poland’s law on associations but this appears to embody a misunderstanding of the latter’s requirement since this is directed to the formation of an entity rather than the appointment of someone to act in an executive capacity on its behalf. Moreover a citizenship requirement for executive bodies does not appear generally to be found in the legislation governing non-profit organizations in

\(^{27}\) See Fundamental Principles on the Status of Non-Governmental Organizations in Europe, Council of Europe, Principle 66 (“NGOs may be regulated in order to secure the rights of others, including members and other NGOs, but they should enjoy the benefit of the presumption that any activity is lawful in the absence of contrary evidence.”)

\(^{28}\) Emphasis added.

\(^{29}\) See paras. 19 and 20.
Council of Europe countries. Of course every State is entitled to require that anyone present and/or employed within its territory fulfills the requirements of immigration law but the provision, as currently formulated, would preclude anyone lawfully resident in the Republic of Kazakhstan from leading the branch or representative office of an international or foreign non-profit corporation established there and thus be inconsistent with international non-discrimination standards. It would thus be appropriate to delete this requirement – together with the similar prohibition introduced by Article 5 of the Draft Law on Amendments with regard to “the chiefs, members of the executive board of the foundation’s administration” - in its entirety, as it is assumed that there is already adequate legislation governing admission to the country in order to take up employment.

44. The process governing accreditation set out in Article 6(2) of the Draft Law on Activity of Branches is to some extent problematic since, although it contains a commendably detailed and relevant set of materials required for an accreditation decision, provision is also made for “additional information” to be requested. This requirement is unsatisfactory in that there is no indication as to the character of the information that might be involved or indeed as to whether more than one request for such information can be made. This means that there is no basis for testing the relevance of what is being required – and for which the expense and delay of obtaining notarized translations may be needed – and it could have the effect of prolonging unduly the deadline for a decision since the 30 day deadline only runs from “the submission of the complete set of documents”.

45. Insofar as the Ministry of Justice finds any reason for concern about the accreditation of a branch or representative office on account of the information supplied, it should instead specify what it considers to be the problem and invite the organization concerned to provide evidence that could allay such concern. This might have the effect of suspending the process but it would have the advantage of bringing the process into the open and avoiding its prolongation for what might be no more than a “fishing expedition”.

46. All but the last of the grounds in Article 6(3) of the Draft Law on Activity of Branches for refusing accreditation are in some respects problematic.

47. The first – the “threat to the national interest in the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan” – suffers from the same vice of imprecision seen in the list of impermissible objectives listed in Article 4(3) but also suffers from the additional defect of embodying an entirely different criterion of acceptability. This will only add to the confusion of both those administering the Draft Law and those subject to its requirements. As previously noted, a power to refuse approval where there were reasonable grounds for concluding that its proposed activities would be unconstitutional or unlawful would be more than adequate as a safeguard for the Republic of Kazakhstan and would also put it in a better position to specify the grounds for refusal.

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30 See Council of Europe, Analysis of the Questionnaire on the Legal Framework for the Setting up and Functioning of Non-governmental Organisations in Europe (ONG (2005) 1).
31 See para. 33.
32 See para. 36.
48. The second – suspension or prohibition of the organization in a foreign State for acts stipulated in Article 4. Apart from the defect in the framing of the latter provision just noted, this ground is unsatisfactory because it does not take account of the unreliability of evidence or the fairness of the proceedings on which the suspension or prohibition is imposed, let alone the proportionality of such a sanction in the given circumstances of the case. This does not mean that suspension or prohibition imposed elsewhere is not something that ought not to be considered but this could be done, while allowing explanations for and criticisms of the sanction also to be submitted, in the course of reaching a conclusion as to whether there were reasonable grounds for concluding that the proposed activities of the branch or representative office to be established in the Republic of Kazakhstan would be unconstitutional or unlawful.

The third – prosecution for various offences of the founder and (or) heads of the organization and their branches and representative offices – not only uses yet another set of criteria for objectionable activities and purposes but also relies on conduct by someone who may no longer represent or be associated with the organisation (“the founder”) or may have been appropriately sanctioned for the conduct in question. Again this does not mean that consideration of a conviction for an offence of the kind listed\(^{33}\) would be unjustified – although the English translation refer only to a “prosecution”, it is assumed that a “conviction” is what was actually intended as otherwise reliance on this would be even more objectionable – but that it could also be done, while allowing explanations to be submitted, in the course of reaching a conclusion as to whether there were reasonable grounds for concluding that the proposed activities of the branch or representative office to be established in the Republic of Kazakhstan would be unconstitutional or unlawful.

49. The fourth – information about proposed terrorist or extremist activity – adds nothing to a refusal based on reasonable grounds for concluding that the proposed activities of the branch or representative office to be established in the Republic of Kazakhstan would be unconstitutional or unlawful.

50. The fifth – unreliable information in the application – does give rise to some concern as to the basis on which the Ministry of Justice might reach such a conclusion about material emanating from another jurisdiction but this could be allayed if the reason for considering particular information to be “unreliable” was provided to the applicant, particularly as there is also provision in Article 6(4) for an appeal to courts against a refusal decision.

51. However, there is currently no provision in Article 6 for the giving of reasons for the refusal of accreditation but, as has already been noted\(^{34}\), it is important that such a decision – whether for unreliable information or reasonable grounds to conclude that

\(^{33}\) Thus in *Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v Turkey*, 13 February 2003 it was remarks and policy statements made by the latter which persuaded the European Court that the party was aiming at “a model of State and society organised according to religious rules” (paras 111-115). However, see also *Dicle for the Democratic Party (DEP) of Turkey v Turkey*, 10 December 2002, in which dissolution based on remarks of party’s former president was held to be a disproportionate response.

\(^{34}\) See para. 37.
unconstitutional or unlawful activities are being proposed - should be reasoned.

52. Article 6(3) of the Draft Law on Activity of Branches should thus be amended to restrict the grounds for refusal to unreliable information and reasonable grounds to conclude that unconstitutional or unlawful activities are being proposed. Furthermore a requirement that all refusal decisions should be reasoned ought also to be added to the Draft Law.

4.6 Suspension and liquidation of branches

53. The provision in Article 7(1) and (6) of the Draft Law on Activity of Branches for the suspension of the activity of a branch or representative office or its complete liquidation on account of a breach of the constitution or of the law of the Republic of Kazakhstan is not in itself problematic. However, it is evident from the case law of the European Court of Human Rights that such sanctions should be exceptional, be based on relevant and sufficient evidence and not be disproportionate. It would, therefore be desirable if the Draft Law made it clear that these considerations should always govern a decision regarding suspension or liquidation. Similarly the importance of observing proportionality ought to be included in provisions introduced by Article 1 of the Draft Law on Amendments, whereby prohibition is specified as a penalty that can be imposed for various violations of the legislation on non-profit corporations.

54. Moreover there is a need to introduce a clear limit on the interval between any suspension imposed by a prosecutor and its confirmation by a court as the absence of any at present in Article 7(1) of the Draft Law on Activity of Branches could lead to a suspension effectively being of longer duration than the six months’ maximum period of suspension that can be imposed by a court. An appropriate interval, particularly given the importance of prompt judicial control over such a measure, should be no more than a couple of business days.

55. Furthermore there would be greater scope for respecting the principle of proportionality if no minimum period of suspension was prescribed – the current figure is three months – so that the court would be free to impose the period that was considered appropriate in the circumstances of the case, even if this was no more than a few days.

56. It should be added that a useful step towards fulfilling the requirement of proportionality is the existence in Article 7(3) and (4) of the Draft Law on Activity of Branches of the possibility of lifting a suspension where the problem giving rise to it has been eliminated.

57. It is not clear that there is any need for suspension or liquidation to be imposed for

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35 Insofar as the proposal that establishing a branch or representative office not be a prerequisite for a foreign non-profit organization carrying out its activities (see para. 17), provision would need to be made for either the suspension of its ability to do this or the complete prohibition on it being able to do so.

36 See, e.g., United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v Turkey, 30 January 1998 and Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v Turkey, 13 February 2003. See also Principle 71 of the Fundamental Principles on the Legal Status of Non-governmental Organisations in Europe.
violation of the branch or representative office’s statute in circumstances where such a violation does not also contravene the Constitution or the law of the Republic of Kazakhstan as the only interest that is likely to be effected by such conduct is that of the parent organization and it ought to be able to decide for itself whether any action needs to be taken. It would, therefore, be appropriate for the second sub-clause of Article 7(1) and the third sub-clause of Article 7(6) of the Draft Law to be deleted.

58. There may be sufficient justification in a given case for a branch or representative office to be liquidated where – as the fourth sub-clause of Article 7(6) of the Draft Law on Activity of Branches envisages – unreliable information was supplied at the time of accreditation. However, the unreliability of the information may not be of any particular significance or be the result of a genuine error and liquidation in such a situation would be disproportionate.

59. It is not known what are the other cases referred to in the fifth sub-clause of Article 7(6) as permitting liquidation but, insofar as they are not restricted to matters such as bankruptcy or the liquidation of the parent organization and given both that the voluntary act of liquidation by the organization is separately covered by the first sub-clause of Article 7(5) and that liquidation ought to be a very exceptional measure, it must be doubtful whether there is a need to have any further basis for imposing such a measure on a branch or representative office. Clarification is thus needed as to what additional cases are covered in the legislation being referred to and, in the absence of a compelling justification for liquidation on the grounds that they provide, this provision ought to be deleted from the Draft Law.

4.7 Property of branches and representative offices

60. The prohibition by Article 8(1) of the Draft Law on the Activity of Branches of any anonymous donations to a branch or representative office (together with the consequential provisions on penalties and confiscation introduced by Articles 1 and 5 of the Draft Law on Amendments) is potentially problematic as this could run counter to the right to privacy under Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Although that right may be restricted where there is a sufficiently strong interest and the principle of proportionality is observed, no such interest is identified in the “Note of Explanation” and the prohibition applies whatever the size or provenance of the donation. It may well be that some restriction on anonymity would be appropriate where large sums are involved and/or the money concerned comes from abroad but there ought to be express stipulation to that effect in the Draft Law on the Activity of Branches and it would, therefore, be appropriate for reconsideration to be given to the scope of this provision.
61. The requirement in Article 8(2) of the Draft Law on Activity of Branches that any “financing, including voluntary material contributions, donations, and any other kind of material assistance” by a branch or representative office is only to be carried out “with the approval of local executive bodies of a region (city of oblast significance)” is unduly bureaucratic and, more importantly, is also likely to impede the activities of bodies established in the Republic of Kazakhstan in pursuit of the right to freedom of association for no apparent advantage, particularly as the provisions introduced by Article 1 of the Draft Law on Amendments entail liability to fines and prohibition for any organization accepting illegal donations.

62. Certainly there is effectively some duplication of controls already placed on branches and representative offices by the Draft Law on Activity of Branches since they are only able to operate in the Republic of Kazakhstan with prior approval for their presence and objectives and since the admission of their funds to the country will be governed by the general laws applicable to customs and foreign exchange. Although the present control goes a little further in that it governs funding or support in a specific instance, the provision is far from clear whether or not the basis for denying approval is limited to the instances mentioned in Article 8(2) – a prohibited source or a prohibited objective – but if it is the procedure would seem to be pointless where both are concerned since they are already adequately regulated.

63. Although the scope of the requirement for approval is generally wide-ranging, the term “any other kinds of material assistance” is especially broad; in effect it would mean that each time someone wished to use a library or other resource on the premises of a branch or representative office there would have to be an application in advance and access to it would only be possible once approval is given, for which the deadline for a decision being ten business days. Such a requirement would an even greater stifling effect on the rights of persons resident in the Republic of Kazakhstan to freedom of association, education and expression (including the right of access to information) than the notification provision in Article 5(2), which has already been found to be problematic.

64. The foregoing concerns are equally applicable to the effect of Article 8(3), which extends the need for approval to the specific activities of branches and representative offices where these are financed by any of the enumerated sources, which essentially cover any source other than some form of governmental entity from the Republic of Kazakhstan.

65. The “Note of Explanation” appears to place reliance on French legislation for the imposition of these approval requirements. The actual Law referred to does not contain a

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39 A provision introduced by Article 5 of the Draft Law on Amendments reiterates this requirement but then (in the English translation at least) states that such approval is not required “if a branch or representative office of an international and foreign non-profit organization receives approval of local executive of a region (city of oblast significance) for financing of non-profit organization” but this does not seem to entail any qualification at all.

40 See paras. 36 and 37.
requirement of approval of funding. Moreover, it expressly allows to receive funds without authorization (“sans aucune autorisation spéciale”). It does no more than set out restrictions on acceptable purposes and sources of donations, something that would seem to be adequately covered by other legislation and other provisions in the Draft Law.

66. Given the negative impact that the requirement of prior approval is likely to have for the legitimate exercise of freedom of association and many of other rights for persons in the Republic of Kazakhstan and the absence of any compelling justification for such a requirement, the most appropriate course would be to delete it.

67. Insofar as restrictions on donations by foreign non-profit organizations are retained, there is also a need to ensure that there is a defence of reasonable excuse for any organization accepting a donation covered by them as it would be an undue interference with the right to freedom of association to suppress an organization that has acted in good faith in receiving a donation that turns out to be improper.

4.8 Accountability

68. There is nothing problematic in principle with the requirement in Article 9 of the Draft Law on Activity of Branches that branches and representative offices publish some form of annual report about their activities. However, this provision - (together with the consequential provision imposing penalties introduced by Article 1 of the Draft Law on Amendments) - is insufficiently precise as to what is needed in order to satisfy this requirement, which is clearly unsatisfactory since non-compliance could give rise to liability and a more precise formulation should be adopted.

69. There is also a need for clarity as to the manner in which verification of the authenticity of the information published can be undertaken by the authorized public bodies. It may well be that this is governed by separate legislation but specific reference to the law(s) concerned should be made in the Draft Law on Activity of Branches.

70. There is also a lack of clarity as to what is entailed by the amendment effected by Articles 2 and 4 of the Draft Law on Amendments to the Tax Code and the Law “On Banks
and Banking Activity”, both of which are concerned with the submission to the tax authorities of “the information about balance and movement on the bank accounts of a taxpayer”. The “Note of Explanation” indicates that this is intended to expand “the list of data to be filed with tax services” but in the absence of the wider context it is impossible to say whether or not its impact on foreign non-profit corporations is unjustified. However, it seems inappropriate to adopt legislation with so little clarity as to the effect of a provision and further details need to be provided. Further clarification should thus be provided.

4.9 Liability

71. The maximum level of the fines that can be imposed – either on the non-profit organization or the chief of a branch or representative office - pursuant to the provisions introduced by Article 1 of the Draft Law on Amendments seems to be unduly high for infractions that in at least some instances are likely to arise from inadvertence or mistake rather than intent. It would thus be highly desirable for it to be made clear that the amount imposed in a particular case must always be governed by the principle of proportionality.

72. Furthermore there is an element of inconsistency in the Draft Law on Activity of Branches insisting on distinct branches or representative offices being constituted for foreign non-profit corporations and the Draft Law on Amendments imposing liability on the corporations for the operation of structures that they would not necessarily have chosen. As the creation of such distinct entities would appear to give them their own legal personality – Article 5(1) of the Draft Law on Activity of Branches gives the branch or representative office rather than the foreign non-profit organization the rights and obligations of non-profit organization of the Republic of Kazakhstan – this should also mean that liability for any wrongdoing is limited to the only entity which is allowed to have legal status in the Republic of Kazakhstan, i.e., the branch or representative office. The provisions imposing liability on the foreign non-profit corporations themselves should thus be rendered inapplicable if a branch or representative office has been established.

4.10 Concluding and transitory provisions

73. The requirement in Article 11 of the Draft Law on Activity of Branches that existing branches and representative offices obtain accreditation is not inherently problematic but the three months allowed for this could give rise to difficulties as there is no real guarantee that the Ministry of Justice will be able to complete the process within this relatively short period. However, no hardship is likely to ensue if this transitional provision stipulated that a branch or representative office that applied for accreditation could continue to operate until the accreditation process had been completed and the Draft Law should be amended accordingly.