International terrorism is a threat to global peace and security and can strike any country and any population - including Denmark and the Danes. The threat of terrorism is complex and unpredictable, and it is important to make use of a variety of tools at the national as well as international level in the fight against terrorism. Thus, a broad action against terrorism is one of the most important priorities of the Danish Government.

Denmark finds it absolutely vital to combat the immediate threat of terrorism by contributing actively to enhanced international co-operation. Furthermore, Denmark finds it important to eradicate the causes of terrorism through targeted development assistance in regions exposed to fundamentalism and radicalism. Denmark is therefore fully committed to the international co-operation in combating terrorism.

In Denmark, the adoption of a first "anti-terrorism package" in 2002 and a second "anti-terrorism package" in 2006, along with a number of legislative amendments, has provided the necessary legislative basis for effective prevention, investigation and prosecution of terrorist activities.


An act of terrorism is defined in Section 114 of the Criminal Code. To label a criminal act as terrorism, it must be committed with: “the intent seriously to intimidate a population or unlawfully to compel Danish or foreign public authorities or an international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act or to destabilise or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation, provided that the offence may inflict serious harm on a country or an international organisation by virtue of its nature or the context in which it is committed.”

A person is liable to imprisonment for a term of up to life imprisonment if he/she commits one or more of a number of serious offences listed in Section 114 (homicide, assault, deprivation of liberty, etc.) with the intent as referred to above.

The same penalty applies to any person who transports weapons or explosives or threatens to commit homicide or assault with the intent described above.

Section 114a contains a list of offences which do not fall within the scope of Section 114 of the Criminal Code, but which are defined as acts of terrorism pursuant to the Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism. If one of the offences listed in section 114a is committed, the sentence may exceed the maximum penalty prescribed for the relevant offence by up to 50 per cent.

Financing of terrorism

If the financing of terrorism is related to a specific crime, it is criminalised as complicity to terrorism.

If the financing of terrorism is not linked to a specific criminal act, it falls within the scope of Section 114b of the Danish Criminal Code.

Pursuant to Section 114b, a person is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years if he/she directly or indirectly grants financial support
to, directly or indirectly provides or collects funds for, or directly or indirectly makes money, other financial assets or financial or other similar services available to a person, a group of persons or an association that commits or intends to commit acts falling within the scope of Section 114 or 114a.

Section 114b of the Criminal Code covers the financing of terrorism in the form of financial support and the collection or transfer of funds, etc.

Section 114b(i) is aimed at individual contributors who provide financial support, out of their own means, to a group which commits or intends to commit acts of terrorism as mentioned in Section 114 and 114a, whereas Section 114b(ii) is aimed at intermediaries or promoting organisations that, e.g., collect money from individual contributors or raise loans from financial institutions, etc. Section 114b(iii) is aimed at financial institutions or individuals, etc., who grant loans commercially or otherwise, or provide another financial service or arrange these grants for terrorists, etc., with a view to obtaining profits, when this is done knowing or suspecting that the means or the grants will be used to encourage or perform acts of terrorism.

Even though the money, etc., is not intended to be used specifically for the procurement of weapons or explosives, Section 114b may be applied merely if the organisation is known by the contributor to be connected with the commission of acts of terrorism. In this connection, it is of no importance whether the actual subscription has an alleged humanitarian purpose if the organisation is known to commit acts of terrorism. Thus, the sole requirement is the intention of the group if terrorist activities form part of its activities or purpose.

There is no requirement of the money or services being transferred directly or placed at the disposal of a group of terrorists as indicated by the words "directly or indirectly". The only requirement is that the group of terrorists will ultimately benefit by the money or the service. If it cannot be proved that the money has actually reached the group of terrorists, the attempt may be punishable if the accused had intended this.

Recruitment for terrorism
Section 114c prohibits recruitment for terrorism. A person is liable to imprisonment for up to ten years if he/she recruits persons to commit or further acts falling within the scope of Section 114 or 114a or to join a group or an association for the purpose of furthering the commission of acts of such nature by the group or association. In particularly aggravating circumstances, the penalty may be increased to imprisonment for up to 16 years. Particularly aggravating circumstances typically include cases of systematic or organised violations.

Section 114c(2) prohibits recruitment of persons to finance terrorism, whereas section 114c(3) extends the field of criminal liability to include any person who allows him/herself to be recruited for terrorism.

Training, instruction and teaching etc.
Section 114d(1) of the Danish Criminal Code criminalises the training, instruction or otherwise teaching of a person to commit or instigate the acts covered by the provisions on terrorism. A person violating this section is liable to imprisonment for up to ten years. In particularly aggravating circumstances, the penalty may be increased to imprisonment for up to 16 years. Particularly aggravating circumstances typically include cases of systematic or organised violations.

Section 114d(2) criminalises the training, instruction or otherwise teaching of a person to provide financial support, etc., to any person, group or association which intends to commit an act covered by the provisions on terrorism.

According to the explanatory notes to section 114d, this provision will apply to, e.g., instruction in the use of weapons, detonation of bombs and also the making of bombs even though the person receiving instruction is not supposed to be the one actually carrying out the terrorist attack.

As in section 114c(3), the field of criminal liability in section 114d is extended to include the trainee.

Aiding and abetting
Section 114e covers acts intended to instigate or contribute to advancing the criminal activity or the common purpose of a person, a group or an association that commits one or more acts falling within the scope of sections 114 to 114d. Violation of this section is punishable by imprisonment for up to six years.

Non-proliferation
The first "anti-terrorism package" also included tightened provisions on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the maximum penalty has been raised to up to six years' imprisonment (against two years previously).

Other relevant legislation

The introduction of the first "anti-terrorism package" was accompanied by several amendments to the Danish Administration of Justice Act aimed generally

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1 Sections 114 to 114a of the Criminal Code.
2 Cf. section 114d(3).
at strengthening the investigative possibilities available to the police. The amended provisions, which facilitate the investigations carried out by the Danish Security Intelligence Service, include data interception, which allows the use of so-called sniffer programmes; repeated covert searches under one warrant, and access to discovery of documents without any prior court order. A number of additional changes aimed at alleviating a variety of practical problems related to the implementation of interceptions of communications were introduced. Thus, a duty was imposed on telecommunications companies and internet service providers to log traffic data of relevance to police interception of communication, etc. The companies are obliged to register and store the data for one year. The relevant provision will enter into force on 15 September 2007.

Furthermore, special provisions were laid down in section 45a of the Aliens Act regarding the exchange of information between immigration authorities and the intelligence services.

Finally, the first "anti-terrorism package" included a range of other measures of importance to the activities of the Security Intelligence Service, for example amendments to the Danish Money Laundering Act and the Danish Customs Act concerned with the freezing and restraint of funds in connection with suspected acts of terrorism or other crimes.

The introduction of the second "anti-terrorism package" was accompanied by other amendments to the Administration of Justice Act aimed at strengthening the investigative possibilities available to the police. In preparation for the prevention of impending acts of terrorism (or other serious criminal offences), section 791c was introduced into the Administration of Justice Act. This section allows the police (including the Security Intelligence Service) (on the basis of a warrant) to jam or cut off radio communications or telecommunications in order to prevent violations of, inter alia, Parts 12 and 13 of the Criminal Code.

**Surveillance**

An important part of all investigations carried out by the police, including the Security Intelligence Service, is the surveillance of individuals, carried out using the human eye or optical instruments. An observation can be retained by photography or film or video recording. The observation of individuals by the police is regulated by section 791a of the Administration of Justice Act.

Under this provision the police may take photographs or carry out observation, by means of binoculars or other devices, of persons who are in a not freely accessible place, provided that such interference is assumed to be of material importance to the investigation of an offence punishable under the law with imprisonment, as set out in section 791a(1) of the Administration of Justice Act.

Surveillance by means of a remotely controlled or automatic camera, TV camera or similar equipment may only take place, however, if the investigation concerns an offence punishable under the law with imprisonment for one year and six months or longer, as set out in section 791a(2) of the Administration of Justice Act.

Pursuant to section 791a(3) of the Administration of Justice Act, surveillance of individuals in a home or other premises by means of a remotely controlled or automatic camera, TV camera or similar equipment or by means of a device used in the home or the premises may only take place if:

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3 Section 791b of the Administration of Justice Act.
4 Section 799(3) of the Administration of Justice Act.
5 Section 806(3) of the Administration of Justice Act.
6 Section 116 of the Administration of Justice Act.
7 Cf. section 148a of the Air Navigation Act.
(1) there are grounds for assuming that evidence for the case can be obtained by such measure of interference;
(2) the interference is assumed to be of decisive importance for the investigation;
(3) the investigation concerns an offence that is punishable under the law with imprisonment for six years or longer or, e.g., intentional contravention of Parts 12 or 13 of the Criminal Code, etc.; and
(4) the investigation concerns an offence that has caused or may cause danger to human life and welfare or community property of substantial value.

The requirement set out in section 791a(1) of the Administration of Justice Act for the investigation of an offence which is punishable with imprisonment as well as the requirement for imprisonment for one year and six months set out in subsection (2) will, in principle, always be satisfied in the case of investigations carried out by the Security Intelligence Service of crimes which fall within Parts 12 and 13 of the Criminal Code (offences against the independence and safety of the State, offences against the Constitution and the supreme authorities of the State, terrorism, etc.).

Interception of communications

The interception of communications by the police – including the Security Intelligence Service – is regulated by Part 71 of the Administration of Justice Act.

Section 780 of the Administration of Justice Act covers the following types of interception of communications: Telephone tapping, other interception (bugging), traffic data, extended telecommunications records (such as transmission mast data) and the opening and stopping of letters.

The specific conditions for interception of communications are set out in section 781 of the Administration of Justice Act.

Firstly, there must be certain grounds for assuming that messages to or from a suspect are conveyed by the communication in question (section 781(1)(i) of the Administration of Justice Act).

It should be noted in this connection that bugging and the collection of extended telecommunications records may only be carried out where the suspicion concerns an offence that has caused or may cause danger to human life and welfare or community property of substantial value.\(^8\)

The second condition for the interception of communications is that the interference is assumed to be of decisive importance to the investigation.\(^9\)

The third and last condition for the interception of communications is a requirement as to the nature of the crime, particularly that the investigation concerns an offence with a maximum penalty exceeding six years or contravention of Parts 12 and 13 of the Criminal Code.\(^10\)

Section 782 of the Administration of Justice Act implies a rule of proportionality, according to which the interference may not take place if, in view of the purpose of the interference, the importance of the case and the outrage and inconvenience that the measure is assumed to cause to the person(s) affected by it, it will constitute a disproportionate intrusion.

Pursuant to section 783(1) of the Administration of Justice Act any interception of communications must take place on the basis of a warrant, and the warrant must indicate, for example, the telephone number that is the target of interception. It has been accepted in practice, however, that the telephone to be tapped may be identified by other numeric codes than the telephone number, for example the IMEI\(^11\) or IMSI\(^12\) number of a mobile phone.

If the purpose would be defeated by awaiting prior permission from the court, the police may decide to carry through a measure of interference.\(^13\) However, the matter must be put before the court as soon as possible and not later than 24 hours after implementation of the measure, whereupon the court will decide whether the interference can be approved and may be continued, if required.

The second "anti-terrorism package" amended section 783 of the Administration of Justice Act, allowing the police (including the Security Intelligence Service) to obtain an interception warrant relating to a person rather than to the particular means of communication. As a result, the police only needs to obtain a single warrant in order to tap the telephone(s) of a suspect. As soon as possible after such interference, the police must notify the court of the telephone numbers subjected to the interference but not stated in the warrant. It should be noted that the specific conditions for interception of communications, as set out in sections 781 and 782, remain unaltered. The amendment, moreover, only applies in cases concerning violation of Parts 12 and 13 of the

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\(^8\) Section 781(5) of the Administration of Justice Act.

\(^9\) Section 781(1)(ii) of the Administration of Justice Act.

\(^10\) Section 781(1)(iii) of the Administration of Justice Act.

\(^11\) Its frame number.

\(^12\) The number identifying its SIM card.

\(^13\) Section 783(3) of the Administration of Justice Act.
Criminal Code (offences against the independence and safety of the State, offences against the Constitution and the supreme authorities of the State, terrorism, etc.).

**Searches**

Under section 794 of the Administration of Justice Act, the police, including the Security Intelligence Service, may carry out searches of rooms, other premises or objects that are available to a suspect, provided that:

1. the person concerned is suspected on reasonable grounds of having committed an offence that is subject to public prosecution; and
2. the search is assumed to be of material importance to the investigation.

The decision to conduct a search will be made by the court by the issue of a warrant. If the purpose would be defeated by awaiting prior permission from the court, the police may make the decision to implement the measure. As soon as possible and not later than 24 hours after the implementation of the search, however, the matter must then be put before the court for a decision on whether it can be approved.

Where the suspect is not present during the search, two housemates or other witnesses should, as far as possible, be called in to attend the search. When the search has been conducted, the police will inform the person who has the room(s) or object at his/her disposal about the search.

If it is decisive for an investigation to conduct a search without informing the suspect or other persons about it in a case dealing with intentional violation of Parts 12 and 13 of the Criminal Code, the court may issue a warrant for such search specifying that no witnesses should attend the search.

**Discovery of documents**

Under section 804(1) of the Administration of Justice Act, a person who is not a suspect can be ordered to present or surrender objects if there is reason to assume that the object may serve as evidence or should be confiscated or if, as a consequence of a criminal offence, someone has been defrauded thereof and can claim it back.

Another consequence of section 804(2) of the Administration of Justice Act is that, if an object has been surrendered to the police under the provisions on disclosure of information, the provisions on seizure from non-suspects under section 803(1) of the Administration of Justice Act will apply. This implies among other things that, under section 189 of the Administration of Justice Act, a duty of confidentiality can be imposed on a person who has been ordered to disclose documents, if the interests of foreign countries, national security or the clarification of serious crime make it appropriate.

Disclosure of documents cannot be imposed on anyone if any information disclosed would prevent or exempt the person in question from making a statement as a witness under sections 169 to 172 of the Administration of Justice Act.

Under section 806(1) of the Administration of Justice Act, decisions ordering the disclosure of documents must be made by the court at the request of the police.

If the purpose of such an intervention would be defeated by having to await a warrant, the police can make a decision about the disclosure of documents. Another consequence of subsection (3) is that the police must present the case to the court as soon as possible and within 24 hours with a view to obtaining approval of the steps if the person against whom the steps are directed has so requested.

**The Aliens Act**

The first "anti-terrorism package" also amended some of the provisions of the Danish Aliens Act, which among other things led to wider and more intensive collaboration between the Danish immigration authorities and the Security Intelligence and the Defence Intelligence Services.

As a consequence of the amendment – the provision set out in section 45a(1) of the Aliens Act – the immigration authorities are permitted to transmit information to the two intelligence services relating to cases with security or intelligence implications for their activities. The Security Intelligence Service could therefore in 2002 initiate significantly closer collaboration with the immigration authorities. For that purpose, the Service has provided the immigration authorities with a detailed definition of cases that may have implications for its work and, co-operating with the Defence Intelligence Service, has briefed the staff of the Danish Immigration Service and the regional state administrations about the criteria for transmitting information and the work carried out by the two intelligence services in general. The criteria defining when to transmit information are adjusted to the current threat assessments at any time.

The primary goal for closer co-operation on cases involving foreign nationals is to ensure that

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14 Section 796(2) of the Administration of Justice Act.
15 Section 796(3) of the Administration of Justice Act.
16 Section 799 of the Administration of Justice Act.
17 Cf. section 804(4) of the Administration of Justice Act.
18 Cf. section 806(3) of the Administration of Justice Act.
individuals who may be assumed to pose a risk to national security are not granted a Danish residence permit.

The Security Intelligence Service is responsible for assessing, on the basis of information received from the Immigration Service, whether an individual may be considered to be a national security risk in the sense of the Aliens Act. If so, the Security Intelligence Service will inform the Minister of Justice, and, based on the information received, the Minister will issue a recommendation to the Minister of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs in conformity with the provisions of section 45b of the Aliens Act. Ultimately, the Minister of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs is responsible for the assessment that will be relied upon when the immigration authorities have to decide whether the person concerned has to be refused permission to stay in Denmark. It is not possible to appeal an assessment that considers a foreign national to be a national security risk to any other administrative authority.

The Minister of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs may also decide (on the basis of a recommendation of the Minister of Justice) that the information relied upon in assessing that a foreign national may be considered a national security risk may not be disclosed to the foreign national concerned, his or her representative or the immigration authority that has to make the final decision in the case. Thus, there is no requirement to specify the grounds.

In addition, the collaboration is aimed at ensuring that the Security Intelligence Service will receive information about persons who may be of intelligence interest in other respects, for example persons whose stay in Denmark should be known to the Security Intelligence Service as the authority responsible for national security at any time. Such persons may be experts on explosives, individuals who have relations with terrorist organisations or sympathise with them, persons associated with the intelligence services of foreign states, etc.

The Security Intelligence Service also makes assessments of the existence of any basis for notifying the Special International Crimes Office, particularly in cases where a foreign national can be linked with war crimes, etc.

**Preventive measures**

In addition to the direct surveillance and investigation of activities potentially related to terrorism, it is a vital focus area of the Security Intelligence Service to enhance its external coordinating role so as to strengthen the aggregate power of resistance of society to terrorism.

Therefore, for the purpose of structured co-operation, the Security Intelligence Service has set up, and will attempt to set up in future, partnerships with authorities, institutions, companies and organisations that, directly or indirectly, handle tasks or possess competencies and knowledge of relevance to the combined efforts in the field of terrorism.

Accordingly, the Security Intelligence Service has established several counter-terrorism contact groups consisting of a wide range of Danish authorities, institutions, companies and organisations. The aim of this co-operation is to ensure the purpose and a well-founded basis for the risk assessments of the Security Intelligence Service, to streamline its products so that they accommodate the actual needs of these partners and to assist with the propagation of these assessments.

Through a so-called awareness programme, the Security Intelligence Service has carried out a targeted effort towards universities and institutions of higher education with many visits to these institutions. The purpose of these visits is to provide the educational institutions with information and guidance, particularly within the area of non-proliferation, but other areas of a security-related nature have also been dealt with, including a general briefing on issues concerning extremist and fundamentalist networks within student environments.

Furthermore, 2003 saw the establishment of a dialogue-based forum with representatives of the various ethnic minorities in Denmark, and in the spring of 2004 the Security Intelligence Service established a similar forum with a number of imams and representatives of the Muslim communities in Denmark. The aim of these initiatives is to build up trust and establish some form of co-operation between the Security Intelligence Service and the ethnic minorities and to exchange viewpoints concerning matters and problem areas of mutual interest. The Security Intelligence Service is planning to initiate co-operation between the two forums on a project which is to focus on radicalisation among young people with an alternative ethnic background.

In 2005, the Security Intelligence Service launched a project called "Police against Terrorism", which is intended to involve the national police further in its targeted efforts to prevent terrorist acts. The aim is to expand police competencies in the area of terrorism with regard to the performance of the day-to-day police work in order to strengthen the total Danish police force, thus increasingly enabling it to spot terror-related indications or activities.
In its capacity as the national security and intelligence service of Denmark, the Security Intelligence Service must prevent, investigate and counter operations and activities that pose or may pose a threat to the preservation of national security and the safety of the population.

To preserve national security is, however, not the only task of an intelligence service. Efficient and permanent preservation of national security and order requires persistent, wide-ranging and coordinated efforts by a large number of authorities. As the national security authority, the Security Intelligence Service obviously plays a central part in this connection in the efforts to ensure the direction and substance of the contributions from the individual bodies and authorities.

As part of its intelligence activities, the main task of the Service is to prevent and investigate actions or undertakings that may jeopardise the independence, safety and legal order of the State and to prevent such actions or undertakings from developing or being implemented.

The actions falling within the area of responsibility of the Security Intelligence Service in that connection are above all the actions which have been criminalised by Parts 12 and 13 of the Criminal Code. Such actions include attacks on the Constitution, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, extremism and espionage. Through its activities, the Security Intelligence Service must provide the basis for handling such threats as early and as appropriately as possible. Lately, the Security Intelligence Service has also been entrusted with the responsibility of analysing the most serious organised crime, meaning gang and network criminality, which is characterised by its international, trans-border and professional nature and is committed through the use of violence, threats and weapons in environments of difficult access and with a high security level.

The Security Intelligence Service is part of the Danish police force. Organisationally, the Service is a unit of the National Police, but due to the special assignments of the Service, the Director General of the Service reports directly to the Minister of Justice.

Unlike the rest of the police and the prosecution service, the Security Intelligence Service does not have the power to prefer criminal charges. If the investigation of the Service gives rise to criminal proceedings proper, the case is surrendered to the ordinary police or the prosecution service. In that event, the actual indictment in cases comprised by the provisions of Parts 12 and 13 of the Criminal Code must, however, be issued by the Minister of Justice, cf. the special provisions of the Criminal Code in this respect. In such case, the Minister of Justice will make his or her decision on the basis of a recommendation from the Director of Public Prosecutions.

Particularly with regard to the preparation of consolidated threat assessments in the field of terrorism, the Security Intelligence Service has set up a Terrorism Analysis Centre which is to produce threat assessments and analyses related to the terrorist threat against Denmark as a collaboration project between representatives from the Security Intelligence Service, the Defence Intelligence Service, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Danish Emergency Management Agency.

The Security Intelligence Service also has a number of assignments not directly linked to the collection of intelligence and investigation against groups and persons suspected of posing a potential threat to national security.

The Security Intelligence Service is thus responsible for the personal protection of the royal family and visitors to the royal family, members of Government, certain politicians and others and must assess and determine a suitable security level relative to these persons and their institutions.

The Security Intelligence Service is also included in the performance of various other preventive security assignments in connection with state visits or other events estimated to require special security, and in that connection the task of the Service is to coordinate security efforts relative to the local police and make recommendations for concrete security measures.

Upon specific request, the Security Intelligence Service assists the police in connection with special police actions, including the resolution of hostage situations, particularly dangerous arrests or other special assignments linked with the investigation and the clearing up of serious crime (the Task Force), and the Service also has a negotiator group and a witness protection programme that the police districts can make use of.

Finally, the Service is in charge of comprehensive preventive efforts, particularly in the field of terrorism, and the Service must generally contribute to providing society with the best possible defence against terrorist attacks, either alone or through partnerships with relevant public authorities and private actors, including dialogue forums, contact
forums, etc., and through broadly targeted information measures.

As the national security authority, the Security Intelligence Service is responsible for the exercise of control and coordination relative to security protection of classified documents, including in relation to the places and persons that handle the information. The Service thus provides relevant security advice on staff measures as well as physical and procedural measures to public authorities, and the Service will also provide the same assistance to private individuals or companies in case of protectable interests relevant to the public, such as the critical infrastructure in Denmark.

The Security Intelligence Service co-operates intensely with a large number of national and international partners, including central national authorities whose activities have an impact on the security field, such as the police, the Defence Intelligence Service, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the immigration authorities and the Emergency Management Agency, as well as bilaterally and multilaterally with foreign security and intelligence services and international organisations and collaboration forums.

### INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

#### United Nations

Denmark is fully committed to co-operating with the United Nations, its Member States and particularly with the Counter-Terrorism Committee established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1373 to combat international terrorism. Denmark stands fully behind the global efforts to implement Resolution 1373 and all other relevant legal instruments against international terrorism. Denmark has signed and ratified the 12 major UN conventions on terrorism and fully implemented UN Security Council Resolution 1373. Furthermore, Denmark has signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism on 14 September 2005.

#### European Union

The Danish membership of the European Union is a key element of Danish foreign policy. Therefore, the Danish Government contributes actively to the implementation and application of EU initiatives by all Member States, including measures mentioned in the Council Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant which was implemented in Denmark in 2004, the Council Framework Decision on joint investigation teams and the Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism, both implemented in Denmark in 2002.

#### Financial Action Task Force against Money Laundering (FATF)

Denmark is a member of the Financial Action Task Force against Money Laundering (the FATF). Denmark fully endorses the standards in the recommendations of the FATF, and the nine special recommendations of the FATF on terrorist financing have been implemented in Danish legislation.

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