"The Norwegian Experience of Gender Quotas"

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The Implementation of Quotas: European Experiences

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Introduction

For many years Norway has been a world leader in terms of women’s representation. When it comes to women’s representation in the national parliament, Norway has been among the top ten countries in the world for a quarter of a century. More than one-third of the representatives elected to parliament in each of the past six parliamentary elections have been female. Furthermore, for more than 20 years, the cabinet has been at least 40 percent female. In the 1980s, Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland was the dominant figure on the Norwegian political stage and worked actively and successfully to promote women’s participation. All of these factors led to Norway being an inspiration to many women around the world who were fighting for greater access to political power.

Superficial knowledge of the Norwegian case led many people to note that, not only were the Norwegians world leaders with regard to women’s representation, but also Norwegian parties had adopted gender quotas. This led to a natural assumption that gender quotas had resulted in the high levels of representation. While this may seem logical, the reality is that, in both Norway and Sweden, quotas were first established in the largest parties only after women had made significant inroads into the party. Before quotas were adopted in the Norwegian Labour Party, women held 25 percent of the parliamentary seats belonging to the Labour Party delegation. Before quotas were adopted in the Swedish Labour Party, women already held more than 33 percent of the seats in the Labour Party Riksdag delegation. So, in the Scandinavian case, quotas may not lead to significant representation, but rather, significant representation may lead to quotas.

Drude Dahlerup and Anita Freidenvall have argued that quotas in Scandinavia represent an example of incremental change. This is certainly true. In both Norway and Sweden, quotas were merely the next logical step in a long process. As such, Dahlerup and Freidenvall question the validity of using Scandinavia as a model for emulation in other countries, where women are trying to institute dramatic and relatively quick changes. The conditions in the countries of Scandinavia are distinct enough that it would not be easy to transplant the Scandinavian institutions in other countries and assume they will function in a similar manner.

To provide a better understanding of the Norwegian case, which will hopefully help people to comprehend both how quotas work and why they work, this case study will
take a close look at the advances made by women in terms of representation. First, the paper briefly describes the legislative recruitment process. Then it outlines the candidate selection process in Norway, before looking at how this process has changed over time as women have lobbied for greater representation in Norway. The final section focuses on relevant lessons for other countries.

The Legislative Recruitment Process

I have examined the legislative recruitment process more extensively in other work. It is useful, however, to spend a little time going over the matter. Legislative recruitment refers to the process of selecting those individuals who eventually serve in legislative bodies. This is a process that Pippa Norris refers to in terms of a set of three hurdles. An individual must first select himself or herself, then he/she must be selected by the party, and finally he/she must be selected by voters. In virtually all countries at the outset of this process the pool of eligible candidates is slightly more than 50 percent female. At the end of the process, though, when the Members of Parliament (MPs) have been selected, the average is only 15 percent female. This means women must be systematically winnowed out at higher rates than men.

The first step in the process involves going from being merely eligible to actually aspiring for office, in other words, seriously considering standing for political office. In most political systems the move from eligibles to aspirants results in more men than women making the jump to aspiring for office. This move is affected by an individual’s political ambition, the political resources that he/she can muster, and the political opportunity structure that defines the chances to run for office. Even in Scandinavia, it is clear that men are in possession of more political resources than women. In addition, men have substantially greater interest in, and knowledge of, politics. This results in an aspirant pool that is skewed towards men.

The second step in the process involves party gatekeepers (such as the election committee of a party or the party leadership) selecting which of the individuals in the aspirant pool the party is going to nominate as its candidates for office. For reasons expanded on below, this is the crucial phase.

The final step involves voters choosing candidates. While many people assume that voters are the problem, and that sexist opinions are revealed in their reluctance to vote for women, most of the rigorous research on this question shows that this is largely not the case. While many voters may have very traditional views as to the proper role of women in society, when citizens step forward to vote they can draw on a vast array of political signals in order to form an opinion of a candidate. Political scientists consistently find the most important cues are the candidate’s party, the policy positions taken by the candidate and his/her party, and whether the candidate is a member of the party in government (that is, an evaluation of the job done by the incumbent regime). Whether a candidate is a man or a woman is of much less importance in the mind of the voter. The party plays such a dominant role in most electoral systems that large numbers of voters can tell you immediately which party they voted for, but they cannot tell you the name of a single person on its list.

So, if the final hurdle does not significantly hurt women, then significant filtering out must occur during the first two stages. As noted above, the truly critical stage in this process is the second one, that is, when the party chooses its candidates. The reason for this is that the result of the first stage still leaves all parties in a situation where they have sufficient numbers of women to fill all of their nomination slots many times over.

Consider the case of Norway and the Norwegian Labour Party. In 2001, around 2.5 million of approximately 3.4 million eligible voters went to the polls to elect 165 representatives. The Norwegian Labour Party has been the largest party in Norwegian
politics for the past 70 years and in the 2001 election it won some 600,000 votes and had 43 of its representatives elected to parliament. Estimates of those who have at one time or another considered standing for office—that is, the size of the aspirant pool—is, in most countries, in the range of ten to 20 percent of the total population. Even assuming that only ten percent of those not just eligible, but of those who actually voted, consider running for office, this still produces around 60,000 possible Labour parliamentary candidates. Even if the number of people who overcome this hurdle is highly skewed, so that 80 percent of those aspirants are male, this still leaves 12,000 hypothetical female aspirants. Compare these 12,000 female aspirants to the party’s need to field a total of 165 parliamentary candidates, of which between 40 and 80 have a realistic chance of actually winning seats, and it becomes abundantly clear that the party could nominate only women many times over if it so desired. What makes the party selection stage vital, then, is that the subsequent stage is not expected to affect women’s representation, and while the stage prior to the selection phase may have led to a skewed pool, it is relatively easy for the party to make up for this in selecting candidates, if it so wishes.

This is one of the most important functions of quotas. They compensate for the imbalance that occurs in the first stage of legislative recruitment. If a party opts for an entirely gender-neutral nomination procedure it is unlikely that it will lead to equal representation, rather it will simply mirror the imbalance that existed in the shift from being an eligible to an aspirant. Quotas can rectify this imbalance by ensuring women receive a larger share of the nominations than their proportion of the aspirant pool. Positive discrimination through quotas or gender neutrality are two options open to parties in moving from the aspirant to the candidate pool. A third option, and certainly one that has been significant historically, is for parties to be discriminatory and to choose fewer women than their proportion in the aspirant pool. In the European context, it seems likely the critical stage will be the one where the party selects its candidates and decides between these three models.

Candidate Selection in Norway

Henry Valen describes candidate selection in Norway as a case of ‘decentralized group representation’. This is a succinct and accurate description of the process. The process is decentralized, as decisions on list construction are made by party leaders at the county level in each of the 20 counties. These party leaders look for candidates who have been loyal to the party and preferably are seen in the community as ‘local notables’. While these factors are central, when developing lists consideration of individual candidates always takes place with group representation firmly in mind. One of the central concerns of the nominating committees is to ensure groups the party perceives itself as representing are represented on the party lists. Women’s march forward over time has occurred because the position of women as a group has altered gradually. Initially women comprised a group with no power or relevance; now the group is seen as crucial, deserving full representation.

Formally, the process of selecting candidates is governed by the Act of Nominations—an electoral law first enacted in 1921. This law guarantees that, while there is some variability in the process, the basic procedure is quite similar across all parties. Within each party a county nominating committee, made up of between five and 15 county party leaders, develops an initial proposal for the party lists. This proposal is made after the committee has received recommendations from local party organizations in all county municipalities.

Next, the proposal is presented to a party nominating convention, at which delegates, who have been chosen at the local level, vote on whether to accept or reject the committee’s proposal one position at a time. The norm is for the list to be accepted as proposed by the committee. Changes and even wholesale rejection of the committee’s
proposal happen often enough, however, that the nominating convention clearly does not exist merely to rubber stamp the committee’s decision.

Under these conditions, the nominating committee’s incentives are fairly clear. It wants to make sure that it does not alienate party members to such a degree that they might risk a revolt. It also wants to make sure that, in a crowded field, with five, six or even seven parties competing for parliamentary seats, the primary interests that their party represents are included on the party lists.

The emphasis on group representation is due to several factors. First, it is very clearly seen as a legitimate principle of representation. While the Anglo-American outlook on the selection of Members of Parliament (MPs) or Members of Congress (MCs) very much focuses on the individual and the selection of a specific candidate on the basis of group characteristics is often seen as an anathema and a violation of the liberal principle of choosing the most qualified person, in the Norwegian context, this is simply seen as a non-issue. Having a corporatist mindset and strong affinities to the consociational perspectives of Belgium and the Netherlands, which stress the need to ensure that all relevant interests are on the table, it is perfectly natural, from a Norwegian standpoint, to think in terms of balancing a ticket. Interests, much more than individuals, are central to the development of party lists in Norway.

Furthermore, decentralized group representation is an effective way of integrating factions and guaranteeing party peace. One can easily imagine a nomination committee chair saying: “Okay, your side did not get the number one slot, but you do not need to start an internal fight over the issue. Your candidate has been placed number two on the list, and that person has an extremely good chance of being elected. We all need to make sure everyone is represented’. Finally, Norwegian party leaders often see a diverse slate as important in appealing to various groups of voters. By placing representatives of a specific occupational group or public interest group in a prominent position on the list, party leaders believe they increase the likelihood of being able to attract the votes of ordinary citizens with ties to those groups.

**Women’s Representation in Norway**

Table 1 shows the level of women’s representation in the national parliament over the past 50 years. One can see that, at both ends of this spectrum, there was relatively little movement. Women did not start making strong gains until the 1970s, and they have made virtually no gains since the mid-1980s. In the period in-between, however, there was strong progress in terms of representation. These phases are divided into four separate categories, which are assessed below.

**Table 1: Women’s Representation In The Norwegian Parliament (Stortinget), 1953–2001**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of women MPs</th>
<th>Total No. of MPs</th>
<th>% women in parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>9.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>35.8</td>
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<td>165</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Giants among men, 1909–1953
In this more than 40-year period—from the point at which women of property gained the right to vote—16 women were elected to serve in parliament. These women are unique in the sense they were able to survive and thrive in an era when being a female politician was extremely rare. Women from the capital, Oslo, were slightly more likely to be elected than women situated in other parts of the country.

At this time, nominating committees emphasized the importance of being an active and loyal party member, although they also looked for persons of standing in the community. Such a person would tend to be someone who held an important occupational position (minister, doctor or teacher), someone with previous experience of public office (local elected official) or someone holding significant status in social organizations outside the party (labour unions or religious organizations). While looking for ‘local notables’ with experience, parties focused on a pool of aspirants that was heavily skewed towards men. Not many women were among the possible aspirants, since few women were members of the labour force, most women were not well educated, and most women had little experience of serving as organizational leaders or on local councils.

Parties made a serious attempt to balance their slates with respect to geography. A heavy emphasis was put on ensuring that all areas of the county were represented. In addition, concern was often expressed about the occupational groups and social organizations with which the party may have had connections. Women, as a conscious interest that needed to be taken into consideration, simply did not exist and were rarely nominated (even more rarely were they placed in a winnable position).

One is enough, 1957–1973
Over this time period women’s representation in parliament increased slowly, rising from eight percent in 1965 to 15.5 percent in 1977. By the 1960s, a second wave of feminism was starting to influence the public debate and there was a call for greater representation. Women outside of the parties were agitating for greater representation, and women inside the parties began to follow suit. This was quite significant. Women had always constituted a substantial portion of the party membership and had always carried out a significant amount of party work. In the past, however, their concerns had largely been tied to the electoral success of the party. As consciousness-raising took hold, though, they started to demand greater representation on the party lists.

In response to these societal changes we see party balancing strategies start to change. List creation looks quite similar to the earlier periods, but, especially at the end of this period, women start becoming seen as a legitimate interest with a right to representation. This is a fairly natural process as nominating committees were already thinking in terms of what “groups” they wanted to insure were represented. This made it relatively easy for women to present themselves as a “group” which had a legitimate right to representation.

While women were seen as a legitimate group, they were only one of many lobbying for representation, and, frankly, at this time, they were not a very powerful group. One can see this quite clearly in terms of the effect of party magnitude,10 that is, the number of seats that a party wins in a district. When party magnitude was low—that is, when a party won only one or two seats—women were not elected to parliament. When party magnitude was higher—that is, when a party won four or more seats—there was almost always a woman being elected.11 Yet, it is quite striking that it was almost always one woman. No county delegation, with the exception of the Oslo Labour Party, ever elected more than one woman during this period (or prior to it either).

Tokenism no more, 1977–1981
This was a transitional period during which one witnessed significant changes in both levels of representation and nominating processes. Representation jumped from 15.5 percent in 1973 to 25.8 percent in 1981. The period of ’one is enough’ was definitively over, as the number of party district delegations with more than one woman representative rose from one to seven. Women continued to press for greater access. Consequently, the nominating process was adjusted again to allow the gender of a candidate to play a much more prominent part in committee thinking as it put its slates together. It became clear that simply including one woman on the list was insufficient in terms of dealing with the matter of representation of women.

This period is also important as it witnessed formal quotas being adopted for women for the first time. In 1975, the Socialist Left and the Liberal Party both adopted gender quotas. This had relatively little direct effect, as only four of the 155 MPs elected in 1977 belonged to these parties, and only one of the four was a woman. The policy had a significant indirect effect, however, in that it clearly challenged the Norwegian Labour Party with respect to the issue of women’s representation. The Labour Party responded to this challenge. In all of the districts where either the Socialist Left or the Liberal Party placed a woman in the number one slot, the Labour Party markedly increased the number of women that it nominated. By contrast, in those districts where the Socialist Left and the Liberal Party did not place a woman in the top spot, the Labour Party’s response was more limited.12

An interesting question is: why did these two parties adopt this policy at this time? There are a couple of key reasons. First, it was the ’right thing to do’. The debate on women’s role in society had clearly had an effect on these parties and taking a policy stand on this issue was important to both parties with respect to their broader public image. The Socialist Left had strong ties with leftist organizations and women within the party were demanding proof of sincere and substantive (rather than merely rhetorical) support for greater equality. The Liberal Party, meanwhile, was in the process of reinventing itself as at least partially a Green party, and there were strong indications that the Greens were among those most in favour of greater representation for women.13 The second reason is that it seemed to make strategic sense with regard to both parties’ attempts to curry favour with voters. Especially for the Socialist Left, which was always looking for ways to distinguish itself from the much larger Labour Party, the adoption of gender quotas was seen as an effective way of attracting leftist women away from Labour and towards its cause. For the Liberal Party, which had been split by the vote on joining the European Union (EU), the adoption of quotas was part of its plan to establish a new identity.

Second among equals, 1985 to the present
Between 1981 and 1985, the level of representation of women in parliament jumped from 25.8 percent to 34.4 percent. Since 1985 four elections have been held and the level of representation of women has never been below 35.8 percent, or higher than 39.4 percent.

The most important event in this period was the 1983 decision by the Labour Party to adopt quotas (implemented in the 1985 election for the first time). The move was crucial, since, as noted above, the Labour Party is the largest party in Norwegian politics. Thus, when it decided to increase the rate of representation, it led to a significant rise in the number of women being elected to parliament. New party rules were honoured (an important requirement for quotas to be effective). These completely changed the role that the sex of the candidate plays in the construction of party lists. Now, candidate sex is one of the first things to be considered by party nominating committees. In just two election periods (1981–1989), women’s representation within the Labour Party delegation went from 33 percent to 51 percent. In the party nominating caucuses, a candidate’s sex went from being a factor of some relevance to one of primary significance. Every other candidate had to be a woman.
Why did the Labour Party adopt quotas? One important factor was that a large section of the party elite viewed it as the right thing to do. This policy has never been seen as a necessary evil or a temporary measure only to be utilized during a transitory phase, as it has been described in some countries. Rather, it is seen as a legitimate way to ensure that women receive the representation that they deserve. That women made up one-half of the population and one-half of Labour voters and hence deserved one-half of the nominations was a compelling argument. A second important factor was that Gro Harlem Brundtland was the leader of the Labour Party and Prime Minister for most of the 1980s. She was a powerful force who was actively engaged with a large number of issues, including pushing the Labour Party in the direction of greater representation of women. Her support for quotas was not necessarily decisive, but it was significant. Finally, even when there was a degree of reluctance on the part of some men within the party or some party strategists, the political reality was that the party was under pressure from the Socialist Left with respect to this issue. Leftist women within the Labour Party could easily say, ‘You do not need to accede to our demands, we can just leave, the distance to the Socialist Left is not very great. If you are not willing to provide us with meaningful representation then we can simply move over to a party that will do so’. In many ways the Labour Party was forced to adopt this policy so as not to lose votes to the Socialist Left.

In a previous work, this has been described as a contagion process, as one party adopts a policy or strategy first implemented by one of its competitors. Once the Labour Party adopted quotas there has been a slow shift to the right in terms of the adoption of gender quotas in Norwegian politics. In the 1990s, both the Senterparty (an Agrarian-based party with a strong anti-EU element) and the Christian People’s Party adopted gender quotas. This means that, of the seven ‘major’ parties in the Norwegian parliament, five have officially adopted quotas. The exceptions are the Conservative Party (Høyre) and the Progress Party (FrP), which are situated on the far right of Norwegian politics. Both have argued they choose the best candidate and do not want to be bound by arbitrary rules requiring them only to consider a man or a woman. Nevertheless, the adoption of quotas by the other parties has put some pressure on the Conservative Party, which has increased its level of representation of women to the point that its parliamentary delegations are consistently in the 30 percent range.

The obvious question to ask is: why, if five major parties have adopted quotas and a sixth is heavily influenced by the others, have women not been able to break through the 40 percent barrier? Fifteen years ago the Swedes lagged slightly behind the Norwegians, but they have continued to move forward, while the Norwegians have stood still. There are two primary explanations for this. First, the Progress Party has become much stronger and this has worked to suppress women’s representation. The FrP is a male-dominated party whose supporters are overwhelmingly male. In the 2001 elections, 26 Progress Party MPs were elected, only three of whom were women (13 percent). Among the other parties, 41 percent of MPs were female.

The second reason is that, although quotas have been adopted, women still tend to be treated as second among equals. If the party magnitude is even (two, four or six seats), parties in recent elections have tended to split the seats evenly between men and women. If the party magnitude is odd, however, (one, three, five or occasionally seven), men are consistently placed first. If we look at the 2001 elections and two-member party district delegations, excluding the Progress Party and the Conservative Party, we see that women achieve parity, holding 50 percent of the seats (16 out of 32). If we look at one-member party district delegations, however, after excluding the Progress Party and the Conservative Party, we see that women hold 36 percent of the seats (15 out of 41). Because of the relatively low district magnitude in the Norwegian counties and the large number of viable parties, a large number of small one-person delegations are generated (more than one-third of all of the party district delegations in the 2001–2005 Storting were single members). If we juxtapose this with the system employed in Sweden, where
there are fewer viable parties, a much higher number of MPs (349 as compared to 165) and a slightly greater number of counties (29 as opposed to 20), one can see in part why the Swedes have continued to make advances in terms of the representation of women, while the Norwegians have foundered.

Conclusion

In assessing changes in women’s representation in Norway, one can see that quotas have played a role, although probably not a vital one. The process must be viewed as incremental, leading to a significant but not equal role for women in Norwegian politics—the adoption of quotas was merely a step towards greater equality. The incremental nature of the process can be seen in Table 1: the rate of increase in women’s representation from one election to the next has never been greater than 8.6 percent. Rather, there has been slow upward movement, reflecting the changing role played by candidate sex in the nomination puzzle. Initially, candidate sex was irrelevant, then it became one of several weak, but legitimate, interests of the parties, and finally it graduated to a position of central importance in the process to construct candidate lists. The most significant event in terms of the impact of quotas and representation was the adoption of gender quotas by the Labour Party in 1983. Note, though, that this occurred after women had already acquired 33 percent of the positions in the party’s parliamentary delegation and when there was a female party leader. This is hardly a case of storming the palace and instituting dramatic change overnight.

In analyzing how the increase in women’s representation came about and the reasons for the adoption of quotas it is clear that culture is important. Second wave feminism raised a number of equity issues that were especially salient within the Nordic context of egalitarianism. But the egalitarian culture is not in itself sufficient. While women have been quite successful in gaining access to positions of political power, they have been much less successful, despite a mighty struggle, in gaining access to large numbers of prominent positions in business.¹⁵

An important part of the explanation for the relative success of women in the political sphere is connected to existing political institutions. The political institutions that were in place were particularly well suited to providing women with the opportunity to acquire positions of political power. In addition, Norwegian feminists, by and large, made an explicit decision to stay and work within existing political parties. They did not leave and establish separate political organizations. The candidate selection procedure placed an emphasis on group representation, hence it was entirely legitimate for women to argue that, as a group, they represented 50 percent of the population, yet enjoyed nothing like that level of representation. Closed list proportional representation in districts with a reasonably high district magnitude meant that internal party decisions with respect to representation led directly to increased representation.

Furthermore, while there may have been those who were sceptical about the calls for greater representation, additional institutional arrangements pushed them in the direction of agreeing to these demands. First, if party leaders refused to consider seriously these demands for greater representation, there was an easy and clear alternative: feminists could simply switch their support to a party that backed their call. This threat meant that many reluctant men felt that they had to improve the rate of representation. Second, party nominating committees knew full well that, if they ignored these demands for greater representation, women within the party were capable of mobilizing and turning out en masse at the party nominating caucuses where each of the decisions of the nominating committee would be reviewed. Just the threat of attempting to overturn committee decisions was sufficient in many cases to get nominating committees to consider carefully women’s demands for better representation. In short, the institutional arrangements played a crucial role in assisting women in their fight for greater representation.
Endnotes


5 The very latest numbers in terms of women’s parliamentary representation are available from the Inter-Parliamentary Union at http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm. As of 1 January 2005, 15.6 percent of the world’s parliamentarians were women.


10 Ibid.

11 This is a general trend that we see across many countries and is the basis on which recommendations to women’s groups that they should carefully consider the electoral system rules when looking to develop strategies to maximize representation have been made. Electoral system rules that lead to significant party magnitudes are very likely to help women, while electoral system rules that result in small party magnitudes are likely to hurt women. The most striking example of this distinction is the large gap that exists in terms of representation between majoritarian single-member districts and proportional representation electoral systems.

12 Matland and Studlar. op. cit.


14 Matland and Studlar. op. cit.