In time of war and danger of war, it may be necessary for the state to act speedily to resolve unforeseen problems. The first twelve chapters of the Instrument of Government offer certain opportunities for intervening in this manner, mainly in the form of delegation of constitutional functions from Riksdag to government (see for example IG 8:7-8). In cases in which no such option is available, a couple of other solutions have been discussed: making it possible to amend the Constitution by means of asingledecision supported by a qualified majority; and the application of constitutionaljus necessitasto delegate a greater or lesser degree of competence from Riksdag to government.

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These solutions have been rejected. Hasty decisions to amend fundamental law would invite the risk of pressure from abroad and lead to ill-judged position-taking. If on the other hand the government were to rely on constitutionaljus necessitas, it would risk having its decisions rejected as illegitimate. It might furthermore make it easier for treasonous groups to seize power.

It was decided instead to create constitutional rules in peacetime which would as far as possible enable public bodies to act within the Constitution even in crisis situations. These rules are set out in Chapter 13 of the Instrument of Government.

Should the country find itself at war or exposed to the danger of war, the Riksdag must be convened (IG 13:1). The Riksdag's decision-making competence may however be delegated to a proportionally-constituted War Delegation (IG 13:2-3). This Delegation consists of the Speaker and 50 other members of the Riksdag (RA 8:12). The Delegation enjoys far-reaching powers and is empowered to functioninter aliain exile.

If the government is prevented from performing its duties in time of war, the Riksdag, like the War Delegation, has powers to decide on the formation of a government and determine its working procedures (IG 13:4).

If both the Riksdag and the War Delegation are prevented from performing their duties in time of war, the government is empowered to assume the functions of the Riksdag `to the extent it considers necessary to protect the Realm and bring hostilities to a close' (IG 13:5). The government is then empowered to act in exile as both legislature and executive. Only the fundamental laws, the Riksdag Act and the Elections Act are excluded from its decision-making competence.

The options for delegation of competence which go beyond those existing in normal circumstances (see p. 33) are available not just in time of war or danger of war but also in certain other crisis situations (IG 13:6). It is also possible in time of war and immediate danger of war to restrict rights and freedoms without recourse to the special procedure with two readings referred to in IG 13:7. The same applies if the War Delegation has replaced the Riksdag in any other case.

Tasks which normally fall to the government may be delegated to subordinate authorities to a large extent. The government's regulatory competence may be delegated for example in time of war or immediate danger of war to regional authorities such as the directors of the regional civilian defence areas and the county administrative boards (IG 13:8).

The Instrument of Government also permits certain special arrangements in respect of the local authorities (IG 13:13).

The Instrument of Government lays down one basic principle for how Swedish public bodies shall operate in occupied territory: they are to `act in the manner that best serves the defence effort and resistance activities, the protection of the civilian population and Swedish interests at large'. The Article goes on, `In no circumstances may a public body make any decision or take any action which, in contravention of international law, imposes on a citizen of the Realm the duty of rendering assistance to the occupying power.' No elections for the Riksdag may be held in occupied territory, nor may elections be held for decision-making local assemblies. Neither the Riksdag, the government nor the War Delegation may take decisions in occupied territory. The Instrument of Government in general prohibits members of the Riksdag and ministers from exercising in occupied territory any of the powers otherwise vested in them (IG 13:10).

If the country is at war the Head of State `should' accompany the government (IG 13:11). If he finds himself separated from the government, he is debarred from exercising any of his functions as Head of State.

The approval of a qualified majority acting under special rules is required before an election for the Riksdag can be held in time of war or danger of war (IG 13:12).

ã The Swedish Parliament

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